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 The origins and early history of
 the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier
 In memoriam Charles Manser Daniels (10 August 1932 - 1 September 1996)
 Julian Bennett
 Bilkent University, Ankara
 Abstract
 With an overall length of about 550km, the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier was among the longest in the Roman Empire.
 It is also the least known, as there is a minimal amount of literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence available
 for the location and identity of the province's garrison. In addition, many of the military stations known or believed
 to have existed on the frontier are now lost beneath the waters of the Keban dam. However, a re-examination of the
 available evidence, along with recent limited and spontaneous fieldwork in the region, allows for some tentative
 remarks to be made on the origins and early history of this frontier. These form the main subject of this article, and
 include the suggestion that Nero should be credited with the genesis of this frontier, not Vespasian, as usually indicated
 in the modern literature.
 ?zet
 Yakla?ik 550km'lik toplam uzunluguyla Pontus-Kapadokya sinin Roma imparatorlugu'nun en uzun smirlanndan
 biriydi. Eyaletin garnizonunun yeri ve kimligi ile ilgili mevcut edebi, epigrafik ve arkeolojik kanitlarm azhgindan
 dolayi en az bilinendirde. Buna ek olarak, sinirda oldugu bilinen veya varsayilan pek ?ok askeri yerle?im
 g?n?m?zde keban barajimn sulan altinda kalmi?tir. Bununla beraber, b?lgedeki kisith ve kendiliginden geli?en
 g?ncel alan ?ah?malanyla mevcut kanitlarm yeniden incelenmesi ve sininn k?kenleri ve ilk tarihi hakkinda bazi
 yakla?ik g?r??ler ortaya koymaya imkan verir. Bu g?r??ler bu makalenin ana konusunu olu?turur, ve modern
 edebiyatta sik?a belirtildigi gibi sininn meydana getirili? onurunun Vespasian'a degil Nero'ya atfedilmesi gerektigi
 ?nerisini i?erir.
 For almost the entire duration of the principate the effective limit of direct Roman control in the
 Anatolian-Eurasian interface zone was defined by the
 Pontic-Cappadocian frontier. This militarised boundary
 zone began at Trapezus (Trabzon) on the Pontus Euxinus,
 and transected the Pontic ranges to enter the upper
 Euphrates valley near Eriza (Erzincan), before following
 that river's course downstream to Charmodara, at its
 confluence with the Chabinas (Kahta ?ay), from which
 point south the middle Euphrates marked the formal limit
 of Roman authority (areae fines Romanorum: Tabula
 Peutingeriana 10.2.U [ed. Weber 1976]). Given the
 400km or so S-shaped track of the upper Euphrates
 between Eriza and Charmodara, the Pontic-Cappadocian
 frontier had a total length of about 550km, making it one
 of the lengthiest border zones in the entire Roman Empire.
 Moreover, this frontier can also claim to be one of the
 longest-lived of such entities. After all, it was conceived
 in the mid-first century and, except for a brief interval
 under Trajan, it remained the de facto limit of direct
 Roman rule in the region until made redundant in around
 420 when (or so it would seem) the then magister militum
 per Orientem militarised and fortified 'Inner Armenia',
 that 'neutral' part of Armenia Major assigned to Roman
 supervision under the peace terms agreed at Ekeleac
 (Ekeghiats) in 387 (Blockley 1987: especially 231; 1992:
 42-44, with 57-58). In all, then, the Pontic-Cappadocian
 frontier zone served Rome for a period of some 400 years,
 a stretch of time roughly equivalent to that dividing the
 reign of Elizabeth I from that of Elizabeth II.
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 These twin claims to fame aside, though, the Pontic
 Cappadocian frontier has a third and less enviable
 standing amongst those concerned with the military
 affairs of the Roman Empire. To begin with, the main
 literary source for its inception and initial function is
 Tacitus' Annales, a work composed substantially post
 eventum and also written in an ostensibly annalistique
 nature which actually makes its use 'a chronological
 nightmare' (Wheeler 2000: 174). Then, just to make
 matters worse, it is beyond any doubt 'the poorest of all
 [Rome's] frontiers in physical and epigraphic material'
 (Wheeler 1997a: 222). Yet despite the imperfect nature
 of the available data it has been possible to establish a
 number of 'facts' relevant to the history and nature of the
 Pontic-Cappadocian frontier, the seminal works being
 Timothy Mitford's unpublished D.Phil thesis and his
 substantially shortened published version of the same
 (Mitford 1972; 1980a). Since these items appeared both
 Mitford and many others, including some of Roman
 Anatolia's most determined and intrepid fieldworkers,
 have continued to search the region for further evidence
 directly or indirectly relevant to the nature and history of
 this frontier (for example, French 1983; Bryer, Winfield
 1985: 48-53; Crow 1986; Mitford 1989; 1998).
 Nonetheless, secure details with which to understand its
 physical substance and the disposition and type of units
 that formed its garrison have by and large eluded
 discovery. Indeed, the legionary bases at Melitene and
 Satala excepted, unambiguous physical evidence for
 almost all the military stations known or believed to have
 existed along this frontier is yet to be discovered, while
 as it is, several of the sites involved are now irrevocably
 lost beneath the waters of the Keban, Kara Kaya
 (Malatya) and Atatiirk dams. And as if this was not bad
 enough, there has been almost no advance in the number
 of inscriptions relevant to the subject under discussion,
 only a scant few - less than a dozen - of the entire
 epigraphic corpus for the region being records of a
 military nature.
 Given this sorry state of affairs it is only natural that
 the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier has always been a
 somewhat neglected topic within the esoteric discipline
 of Roman frontier studies. It is also only natural to pose
 the pertinent question of 'Can anything new be said at
 this time about this frontier?' Yet the answer has to be an
 unqualified 'Yes', for while certain aspects and 'facts'
 concerning this topic have been subject to reconsider
 ation over the past 20 years or so, there has been no
 attempt at an overall reassessment of the Pontic
 Cappadocian frontier in the light of relevant advances in
 our knowledge (and beliefs) regarding the early Imperial
 Roman army and Roman 'frontier policy' in general.
 Moreover, the few new details that have surfaced
 regarding the physical nature of the Pontic-Cappadocian
 frontier, some resulting from necessarily ad-hoc and
 spontaneous fieldwork in the area, do allow for a critical
 re-examination of the existing historical and archaeo
 logical evidence, and thus the proposal of alternative
 explanations and interpretations from the broad infor
 mation base that is available. Consequently, although a
 properly organised plan of fieldwork and excavation in
 the region is badly and urgently required before we can
 begin to understand fully its history, nature and function,
 it is nonetheless possible now to question seriously the
 popular belief that the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier line
 was not defined as a fortified border zone until the fourth
 century (for example, Speidel 1983a: 8; Crow 1986: 89;
 Hodgson 1989; Wheeler 1991; but note Mitchell 1993:
 119). Furthermore, this process of re-evaluation allows
 the suggestion that the frontier's integral elements owed
 their genesis to Nero, not Vespasian and his immediate
 successors, as is often thought. That said the starting
 point for this essay has to be the creation of provincia
 Cappadocia, the Schwerpunkt of the entire system.
 The formation of provincia Cappadocia
 The historical record concerning the annexation of
 Cappadocia is fairly straightforward. In AD 14,
 Archelaus I Philopatris Ktistes, its then ruler, was
 summoned to Rome by the new emperor Tiberius to
 answer various charges made against him. These charges
 are not specified in our sources but it seems he was
 plotting to restore to rule his grandson, Tigranes IV,
 deposed as king of Armenia Major in ca. 5-6 (Tacitus
 Annales 2.3-4; Dio 57.17.7; see Sullivan 1980a: 1160).
 In the event, sometime in 17 the elderly and gout-stricken
 Archelaus died after being arraigned before the Senate,
 but before a formal decision was reached on these
 charges (Tacitus Annales 2.42). The punctilious Tiberius
 then formally asked the Senate for its consent to annex
 Cappadocia as a Roman province, probably adopting this
 approach because of Augustus' testamentary injunction
 that the 'boundaries of the Empire should be confined to
 their existing limits' (Tacitus Annales 1.11; see Dio
 56.33.2-3). Yet Tiberius evidently argued his case with
 skill as the Senate equally punctiliously granted him the
 permission to do as he wished (Strabo 12.1.4 [534];
 Tacitus Annales 2.42; Suetonius Tiberius 37.4; Dio
 57.17.7).
 Augustus had established the doctrine that Rome's
 client subjects held their territories at Rome's discretion
 (see Strabo 17.3.25 [840]). Consequently, by Tiberius'
 time a pattern of action had developed in which a client
 state was only converted into a province if a ruler died
 without a viable replacement who could assert their
 authority over the territory in question (Mitchell 1993:
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 61-63). Thus, when Antiochus III of Commagene died
 about the same time as Archelaus, then once it was
 deemed his son was too young to rule in his own name
 Rome assumed custody of the territory until he came of
 age and was restored to his inheritance in ca. 37 as
 Antiochus IV (Tacitus Annales 2.42, 56; Dio 59.8.2;
 Suetonius Caligula 16.3). In the case of Cilicia, on the
 other hand, whose ruler Philopator likewise died in the
 year 17, Rome appears to have replaced him almost
 immediately with a nobleman named Archelaus (Tacitus
 Annales 2.42). Cappadocia, however, became a Roman
 province, even though it seems that Archelaus I
 Philopatris had at least one son, apparently the same
 Archelaus imposed on Cilicia at this time (Tacitus
 Annales 6.41; Sullivan 1980a: 1167-1168). In other
 words, the annexation of Cappadocia was probably
 decided upon even before Archelaus I Philopatris died.
 Tacitus' account would, indeed, seem to confirm this was
 so: he implies that Tiberius personally calculated how the
 income to be won from the territory would allow a
 halving of the centesima rerum venalium, the 1% sales
 tax, a levy which at that time was causing general unrest
 among the plebs at Rome (Tacitus Annales 2.42, 56).
 That Cappadocia was a territory of sufficient real or
 potential economic value to justify annexation by Rome
 might seem surprising to those with only a passing
 acquaintance of what is now a somewhat barren and in
 parts unforgiving landscape. In fact, at the time we are
 concerned with, Cappadocia was renowned for its mineral
 resources (especially its highly regarded 'Sinopean'
 ruddle) and for the quantity and quality of its fruit and
 cereals (Strabo 12.2.10 [539-540]). It was even better
 known for its livestock: hence the 1,500 horses, 50,000
 sheep and 2,000 mules Cappadocia supplied as part of its
 annual tribute to the Achaemenids, although by the Julio
 Claudian period sheep were less important in the local
 economy than cattle (Strabo 11.13.8 [525], with 12.2.10
 [539]; but note the fame of Cappadocian cloth in later
 years: Expo sitio totius Mundi et Gentium 40 [ed. Rouge
 1966]). The Cappadocian breed of horse, on the other
 hand, continued to maintain a high reputation for its speed
 and strength into Roman times and beyond (for example,
 Fink 1971: 403, no.99; Hyland 1993: 108-109, 111).
 Naturally, we cannot assess the relative worth of these
 commodities in the local economy when Cappadocia
 became a Roman province, nor can we even begin to
 assess the overall economic value of the area in cash
 terms. However, an approximate order of magnitude for
 Cappadocia's financial potential in the Julio-Claudian
 period is provided by the fact that the much smaller and
 less agriculturally-favoured region of Commagene
 rendered one billion sesterces in taxes to Rome in the two
 decades after its annexation in 17 (Suetonius Caligula
 16.3). This sum was equivalent to 25,000,000 denarii,
 and thus enough to pay the basic Stipendium for an entire
 legion throughout the 20 years involved (see Speidel
 1992: 88). The point being that the chance of exploiting
 the larger and presumably richer territory of Cappadocia
 for the benefit of Rome must have seemed a godsend to
 Tiberius, especially given the great pressure he was then
 under to reduce the 1% sales tax and yet maintain a
 balanced budget (Tacitus Annales 1.78).
 Thus the decision to annex Cappadocia as Roman
 territory for economic reasons, and by a possibly fortu
 itous circumstance, a decision that coincided with the
 departure of Tiberius' adopted son Germanicus to the
 east. Tiberius had awarded him the power of procon
 sular Imperium maius in the region, that is, absolute
 authority over all matters in the provinces and client
 states concerned, principally in order to enforce Rome's
 right to install a new ruler of Armenia Major, a privilege
 awarded to Rome under the terms of the treaty made with
 Parthia in 20 BC (Augustus Res Gestae 27.2; Tacitus
 Annales 2.43, 2.56). As it was, Tiberius had personally
 supervised the ratification of that treaty, after which the
 Roman nominee, Tiridates III Artaxias, was enthroned as
 ruler of Armenia Major: thus in a sense Germanicus was
 directly replicating his adoptive father's own role at that
 time, but in his case directing the installation of Zeno, a
 son of the king of Pontus, and who now took the
 Armenian dynastic name of Artaxias III. More to the
 point, though, Germanicus was now also given the
 responsibility of attending to matters in Cappadocia (and
 presumably Commagene and Cilicia as well), and so it
 was while he was on his journey through the region in 18
 that Archelaus' kingdom was 'reduced to the form of a
 province' (Suetonius Caligula 1.2). The process itself
 was entrusted to Quintus Veranius, one of Germanicus'
 aides, although the only act we can directly attribute to
 this man is a reduction in the rate of tribute the Cappado
 cians paid into the formerly royal and now provincial
 treasury, a measure that not only made the change in ruler
 more agreeable but still produced the surplus Tiberius
 needed to halve the 1% sales tax at Rome (Tacitus
 Annales 2.46).
 Veranius completed his duties in Cappadocia
 sometime before the year 20, as he was back in Rome by
 then, and so he must have handed control of the province
 to his successor in 18 or 19. Unfortunately we do not
 know the name of this new governor of Cappadocia,
 although our sources are quite clear that he and all of his
 successors until the reign of Nero was a person of eques
 trian rank (Tacitus Annales 3.10; Suetonius Vespasian 8;
 Dio 57.17.7; also R?my 1986: 30-33). In this sense the
 method of administration introduced into the new
 province marked a notable departure from the system of
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 provincial government devised by Augustus in 27 BC.
 That reform resulted in the provinces being broadly
 divided into the two groups we know as the imperial
 propraetorian and the senatorial proconsular provinces
 (Strabo 17.3.25 [840]; see Dio 53.13-15). There was
 some flexibility and some inconsistency in the system as
 first formulated and as it later functioned, but generally
 speaking, the imperial provinces were those bordering
 hostile territory. Thus they were provided with one or
 more legions, and administered by a propraetor, a man of
 senior senatorial rank chosen by the emperor to guard and
 control the territory for a three-year period on his behalf:
 hence this official's title of legatus, or 'delegate'. The
 senatorial provinces, on the other hand, were regions that
 were - to paraphrase Strabo - 'peaceful and simple to
 govern without an army' (Strabo 17.3.25 [840]); an
 'army' in this context being a legion. Consequently, these
 territories were provided with only a small contingent of
 auxiliary troops for internal security, and they were
 administered by a proconsul, likewise of senatorial rank,
 but appointed for a one-year term by the Senate to act on
 its (nominal) behalf. Cappadocia, however, became the
 first of what are known as the imperial equestrian or
 praesidial provinces, those generally rather small regions
 normally located far from any obvious external threat and
 which were also usually thought of as being constituent
 parts of the emperor's own personal property (Dio 15.2).
 As a result, such regions were also only provided with a
 limited number of auxiliary units to maintain internal
 security, while the emperor delegated their supervision to
 men of equestrian rank chosen from among his own
 clientele, sometimes giving them the title of praefectus to
 indicate their dual civil and military responsibilities, at
 other times naming them as a procurator, as they 'took
 care of the emperor's property.
 On the face of it, Cappadocia was hardly the appro
 priate place in which to inaugurate a new system of
 provincial rule in which a middle-ranking official was
 provided with a small auxiliary garrison to provide
 security for an entire province. After all, the territory
 directly bordered onto Armenia Major, a buffer state
 mutually coveted by Rome and Parthia and the stimulus
 for past (and future) wars between the two on account of
 its pivotal strategic location between Asia Minor and
 Persia (Luttwak 1976: 26). Thus it might have been
 expected that Cappadocia would be made an imperial
 province with a legatus and at least one legion. And in
 fact Tiberius' failure to do precisely this has caused
 adverse comment among some modern historians, who
 claim that he failed to appreciate the true strategic value
 of the territory or deliberately ignored this for personal
 reasons (for example, Levick 1976: 141; Luttwak 1976:
 26-27). Hence the idea has assumed currency that
 Tiberius' main reason for making Cappadocia a
 praesidial province was simply to guarantee that the
 surplus revenue extracted from there went directly into
 his own coffers (see Levick 1976: 141; and more recently
 Mitchell 1993: 98).
 Now, it is true that Tiberius had an unrivalled contem
 porary reputation for parsimony; it is also true that he left
 the imperial treasury crammed full with the enormous
 sum of 2,700,000,000 sesterces, an amount that might
 seem to justify this reputation (Suetonius Tiberius 38,
 46-49, with Caligula 36). However, to insinuate that he
 was that miserly and morally bankrupt as to jeopardise
 the security of a province for his own personal benefit is
 to wholly misjudge the man. Moreover, it frankly
 ignores the diligence with which he approached his
 obligations and duties as princeps, a role he had never
 wanted. Finally, this view also disregards Tiberius' solid
 personal experience of both the region and the Parthians:
 indeed, he received a rare posthumous commendation for
 his guile in protecting Roman interests in the east
 (Tacitus Annales 6.32). Therefore we might instead
 conclude that in making Cappadocia a praesidial
 province, Tiberius was quite carefully and deliberately
 avoiding any action that could be interpreted as a threat
 to Parthia itself, while simultaneously demonstrating his
 faith that the Parthians would hold fast on the agreed
 status of Armenia Major.
 Even so, as already indicated, it was recognized that
 the governor of this new territory should be provided with
 some form of military force if for no other reason than to
 guarantee security within the province. Such was indeed
 the common practice among the so-called inermes
 provinciae or 'undefended provinces', those territories
 like Cappadocia that lacked a legionary garrison, and
 which were instead garrisoned by auxiliary troops under
 the direct command of the governor concerned (Ritterling
 1927; Bennett 2007: 134-35). Quite how large such a
 garrison might be plainly depended on a combination of
 the territory's size and the perceived threat to its security,
 although it seems that one or at most two auxiliary
 regiments was generally considered sufficient, the usual
 type of unit involved being a cohors equitata, a body
 constituted from 500 or so infantrymen and about 120
 cavalry troopers (Bennett 2007: 135; Eck, Panged 2004:
 140-41). However, in the case of those imperial eques
 trian provinces where there was a perceived internal
 and/or external threat of some magnitude then a larger
 garrison was supplied. Thus in pre-Flavian times, the
 praesidial province of Judaea, a territory notorious and
 infamous for endemic strife among its Jewish
 community, was apparently provided with one cavalry ala
 and a total of five cohortes, of both the regular infantry
 and the part-mounted type (Speidel 1983b: 233).
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 As far as the province of Cappadocia is concerned,
 we have no objective means of telling the size of its
 garrison in the early Julio-Claudian period. On the
 other hand, the province comprised an area of some
 80,000km2, considerably larger than Judaea, at about
 25,000km2. Moreover, its eastern border flanked Armenia
 Major, a territory whose suzerainty was occasionally a
 matter of armed dispute between Rome and Parthia.
 Thus we might assume Cappadocia was given a garrison
 of at least the same size as that considered necessary in
 Judaea, and, as we will see, circumstantial evidence
 supports this proposition. Likewise, it is probable that
 just as in Judaea, most of these units were based (during
 the winter at least: Tacitus Annales 13.8.) in the principal
 main urban settlements that then existed in Cappadocia,
 namely Archelais, Comana, Melitene, Sebastopolis and
 Mazaca-Caesarea (see Pliny Historia Naturalis 6.3.8).
 One or two units, however, or even small detachments of
 troops, were probably stationed at suitable points along
 the main routes within the province to guarantee their
 security, and we might also expect that caution demanded
 a military presence along that part of the upper Euphrates
 constituting the formal political boundary with Armenia
 Major (on the role of the river in this sense, see Strabo
 11.12.4 [522], 11.14.2 [527]; Ptolemy Geographia
 5.12.1; also Braund 1996). Furthermore, to guarantee the
 continuance of Armenian 'neutrality', a Roman official
 and a force of auxiliaries could well have also been
 assigned to Zeno Artaxias in Armenia Major. After all,
 provision of this kind was provided for his later successor
 Mithridates (Tacitus Annales 12.45), while it had already
 become accepted practice for Roman army units to be
 established in territories beyond the formal limits of
 Roman control: thus, for example, the garrison estab
 lished by ca. 22 BC at Qasr Ibrim, some 150km upstream
 of Elephantine and the Nile's First Cataract, the formal
 southern border of Roman Egypt (Weinstein, Turner
 1976: 115).
 It would seem that the combination of Tiberius'
 minimal military arrangements in the new province of
 Cappadocia and his astute diplomacy satisfied Parthia's
 rulers that the annexation of the territory did not pose an
 implicit threat to their own realm. Such at least might be
 concluded from the absence of any direct reference to the
 province in the historical record for the remainder of
 Tiberius' reign. On the other hand, the security of the
 province was doubtless one of the many matters that
 concerned Tiberius in the potentially precarious state of
 affairs that followed the death of Zeno Artaxias III in 34
 or 35. What brought about this uncertain situation was
 the unilateral decision of the Parthian ruler, Artabanus II,
 to replace Zeno with his own eldest son, Arsaces, so
 breaking the accord over the Armenian succession - and
 then adding insult to injury by demanding a series of
 concessions from Rome (Tacitus Annales 6.31). Tiberius
 responded with a series of astute manoeuvres that
 displayed a quite Machiavellian command of political
 matters in Parthia and the region as a whole. He first
 capitalised on barely-hidden discontent amongst the
 Parthian nobility to foment a civil war and depose
 Artabanus, and then encouraged the pro-Roman Mithri
 dates, a dispossessed scion of the Armenian-Iberian royal
 families, to seize power for himself in Armenia Major
 (Tacitus Annales 6.31-37). By 36, Mithridates was
 safely ensconced as ruler of his new kingdom, and
 although Artabanus was able to reassert control over
 Parthia, after various travails, he was forced to accept a
 return to the status quo ante regarding Armenia Major,
 allowing Tiberius to relax in the knowledge that a Roman
 nominee was once again securely emplaced on the
 Armenian throne (Tacitus Annales 6.43-44).
 Cappadocia during the principate of Gaius-Caligula
 and Claudius
 Although Tiberius' incisive grasp of eastern affairs served
 to ensure peace and stability in the immediate region
 throughout his reign, the tactless actions of his successor
 Gaius-Caligula, declared princeps in March 37,
 ultimately threatened all he had achieved in the region
 and elsewhere. To be sure, such a possibility could not
 have been anticipated at the beginning of Gaius' reign, as
 he initially pursued a policy of peaceful co-existence with
 all the Empire's neighbours, especially those in the east.
 Thus he provided new rulers for Armenia Minor and
 Pontus, installing Cotys of Thrace as king of the first and
 Cotys' brother Polemo as king of the second, and he then
 returned Commagene to its rightful ruler, Antiochus IV,
 compensating him for the tribute Rome got from the
 territory during the inter-regnum (Dio 60.12.2; Suetonius
 Caligula 16.3). Indeed, so accommodating was Gaius
 towards the east at this time that Artabanus of Parthia met
 with the governor of Syria to offer a sacrifice to the new
 emperor (Suetonius Caligula 14.2).
 But this happy state of external affairs began to
 unravel when Gaius conceived of a plan to better secure
 his reputation and position at Rome through the acqui
 sition of foreign territory. A first step was the sudden
 arrest and then murder in 39 of Ptolemy, king of Maure
 tania, followed by an armed attempt at securing the
 kingdom as a praesidial province (Dio 59.25.1, with
 60.9.5; Seneca de Tranquil?zate Animi 11.12; Suetonius
 Caligula 26.1, 35.1; Pliny Historia Naturalis 5.11).
 Next, in apparently the same year, Gaius ordered the
 equally sudden arrest of Mithridates, the ruler of
 Armenia Major, and deposed Cotys of Armenia Minor
 and Antiochus IV of Commagene, their territories being
 81
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 brought back under Roman control (Tacitus Annales
 11.8; Dio 60.8.1; Seneca de Tranquillitate Animi 11.12;
 see Wardle 1992: 441-43). These actions took place at a
 time when Parthian attention was distracted by a civil
 war initiated by the death of Artabanus in 38, and so we
 might reasonably conclude that Gaius also intended to
 take direct control of Armenia Major, not the least
 because family honour perhaps demanded such a course
 of action. After all, Gaius Caesar, Augustus' grandson,
 and the emperor Gaius' uncle as well as namesake, had
 been planning just such a project when he died in 2 BC
 (Seneca de Brevitate Vitae 4.5). However, any plans to
 annex Armenia Major were put on hold by the end of 39,
 by when Rome had dramatically lost the military
 advantage in Mauretania: so whatever Gaius's feelings
 and ambitions decreed, practicalities cautioned against a
 concurrent military adventure in the east. Then, in 40,
 even the slightest chance of success in Armenia Major
 evaporated with the end of the civil war in Parthia, and
 the decision of Vardanes, the new Parthian king of kings,
 to take advantage of Mithridates' absence and install his
 general Demonax as his viceroy in the territory (Tacitus
 Annales 11.8, with 9).
 Gaius' murder in January 41 thrust his uncle Claudius
 into the position of princeps and brought with it an
 immediate change in Roman foreign policy. The new
 ruler at once set about imposing order on Mauretania by
 ordering it to be divided into two praesidial provinces,
 and by dispatching two highly experienced generals to
 deal with the rebels there (Dio 60.9.1-4). The next year,
 or the one after, he freed the deposed Mithridates from
 custody, and encouraged him to take back Armenia
 Major by force, which he did with the aid of his brother,
 Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, and some Roman military
 units assigned to him for the purpose (Tacitus Annales
 11.8-9). Vardanes, meanwhile, was attending to matters
 at Seleucia on the Tigris, which he had just re-captured
 after seven or so years of rebellious independence.
 However, he soon responded to Mithridates' victory by
 preparing for an invasion of Armenia Major, but was
 dissuaded from doing so by Vibius Marsus, governor of
 Syria, who threatened an instantaneous retaliatory attack
 on Mesopotamia (Tacitus Annales 11.10).
 Claudius' forthright manner of dealing with this
 threat to Armenia Major seems to have ensured that all
 remained quiet on the eastern front for the next few years,
 until unrest in Parthia provided the vehicle for major
 changes in Roman policy in the region. The series of
 events that led to this are described in some detail by
 Tacitus (Annales 12.14), who tells us that the catalyst
 came with the murder (by 'person's unknown') of
 Vardanes in about 47-48 and the immediate accession of
 his elder brother, the fratricidal Gotarzes II 'Epiphanes'
 as Parthian king of kings, the specific spur for Parthian
 discontent being how the new ruler initiated a reign of
 such violence and licentiousness that great unease spread
 throughout his domain. This in turn motivated a group of
 Parthian noblemen to approach Claudius with the request
 that he release from 'captivity', as a rival candidate for
 the Parthian throne, one Meherdates, a junior member of
 the Arsacid dynasty, who had originally been dispatched
 to Rome as a child-hostage by his own grandfather,
 Phraates IV (see Tacitus Annales 11.10). In the event,
 Meherdates (who was notorious for his fondness of drink
 and banquets) proved so incompetent that this attempt at
 rebellion failed miserably. But then two years later, in
 51, Gotarzes himself died in mysterious circumstances,
 plunging Parthia into a brief civil war that ended later the
 same year when Vonones II (possibly his younger
 brother) assumed the title of king of kings, only to be
 immediately deposed by his own son, who become king
 as Vologaeses I (Tacitus Annales 12.14).
 In themselves these events seem to have hardly
 impinged on Roman foreign policy in the east. On the
 other hand, Claudius' apparent failure to show any
 concern over matters in Parthia, or the general climate of
 political uncertainty in the region, seems to have directly
 inspired Pharasmanes of Iberia to divert the attentions of
 his rebellious son Radamistus towards a group of disaf
 fected Armenian nobles, and then encourage him to lead
 a revolt against his own uncle, Mithridates of Armenia
 Major (Tacitus Annales 11.10, 12.44-45). Mithridates
 sought refuge with the Roman garrison inpraesidia at the
 Armenian summer residence of Gorneae, which
 Radamistus at once placed under siege. However, when
 the legionary centurion in charge of the post left to
 inform the governor of Syria of the circumstances, the
 perfidious and avaricious Caelius Pollio, the auxiliary
 prefect in command in his absence, surrendered Mithri
 dates to Radamistus, who immediately had his uncle
 executed (Tacitus Annales 12.45-47).
 The governor of Syria at the time was Ummidius
 Quadratus, and when he learned what was happening in
 Armenia Major he chose to exercise caution while
 awaiting Claudius' instructions (Tacitus Annales 12.48).
 Not so, however, Julius Paelignus, the procuratorial
 governor of Cappadocia. When apprised of the situation
 he instantly assembled his auxiliary forces with the intent
 of restoring Mithridates to his throne, only to witness his
 soldiers desert en masse before seeing combat, allowing
 Cappadocia to be ravaged by 'barbarian incursions'.
 Paelignus accordingly sought prudence over valour
 (although bribery is alleged) and formally recognized
 Radamistus as king of Armenia, but the combination of
 his blatant delinquency and the raids into Cappadocia
 resulted in Quadratus dispatching a legion into Armenia
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 Major to resolve matters, only for it to withdraw after
 crossing the Kurdish Taurus for fear of provoking a war
 with Parthia (Tacitus Annales 12.48-49). As it was, this
 pusillanimous conduct achieved exactly the opposite
 effect, for it encouraged Vologaeses to intervene in
 matters in 52 and support his own brother Tiridates in an
 attempt on the Armenian throne. Thus, once again,
 unilateral action on the part of a Parthian ruler had
 breached the Augustan arrangements for peace in the
 region, and in this case also precipitated a civil war in
 Armenia that lasted until 54, by which time not only had
 Tiridates replaced Radamistus as king of Armenia Major,
 but Rome also had a new ruler, Nero (Tacitus Annales
 12.50-51, with 13.6)
 The genesis of the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier
 The political situation Nero inherited in the east on his
 accession in October 54 was of great concern at Rome:
 hence Tacitus devotes a whole chapter of the Annales to
 the new emperor's reactions (Tacitus Annnales 13.8).
 We learn how Nero ordered that those army recruits
 newly drafted in 'the adjacent provinces' to Syria be
 assigned to the 'legions of the East', that is, the Syrian
 army; also that two of the Syrian legions and their auxil
 iaries, thus one half of the Syrian garrison, should take up
 position on the Armenian border (in fact in Cappadocia,
 as we will see) and prepare bridges for crossing the
 Euphrates. In addition, Marcus Agrippa, ruler of Chalcis
 and Judaea, and Antiochus IV of Commagene, were
 commanded to make ready their own royal armies for
 action, while Armenia Minor was detached from Pontus
 and presented to Aristobulus, dispossessed son of Herod
 of Chalcis, and Sophene was granted to Sohaemus of
 Emesa. In the event, open war was avoided when
 Vologaeses' son, Vardanes, rebelled against his father,
 causing the Parthian army to be withdrawn from
 Armenia, thus leaving Tiridates on his own and
 persuading Nero's sycophants to award the princeps
 triumphal honours for the perceived 'victory'.
 This was not enough for Nero and his advisers,
 however, for they required nothing less than a full and
 decisive resolution of the situation with Parthia vis-?-vis
 the control of Armenia Major - through war if necessary.
 Consequently, they continued with their plans and
 sometime in early 55, by when the two legions and their
 auxiliaries seconded from the Syrian garrison had taken
 up position along the Euphrates in Cappadocia, the
 territory was formally combined with Galatia to form a
 single province. The presence of two legions in the
 province meant that Galatia-Cappadocia was now
 elevated to the status of a senior imperial province, and
 propriety as well as common sense demanded it be
 assigned to a man of consular rank with the proven
 administrative and martial skills necessary to govern a
 territory now on a war-footing. Accordingly the person
 chosen for the task was Cn.Domitius Corbulo, a man
 who had demonstrated his military acumen under
 Claudius in Germany, and whose recall from 'retirement'
 to assume this new command gives a hint as to the
 severity of the situation as it was then perceived.
 Unfortunately, though, while making their arrange
 ments for the new province, Nero and his advisers
 evidently failed to take into account the personality of
 Ummidius Quadratus, still in place as governor of Syria.
 He clearly saw the loss of one half of his army to the new
 Galatia-Cappadocia command as an undeserved insult,
 and so instead of risking a perceived loss of face in his
 own province, Quadratus decided to relinquish the two
 Syrian legions and their auxiliaries to Corbulo at Aegeae
 in Cilicia (Tacitus Annales 13.8). Moreover, it is
 possible that the legions he gave to Corbulo, the 777
 Gallica and the VI Ferrata, were chosen deliberately for
 secondment on account of their laxity and general lack of
 discipline (see Tacitus Annales 13.38, with 35). True,
 this specific accusation as to their readiness for war may
 have been a literary topos, for the eastern legions were
 frequently charged with slackness, sometimes without
 clear justification (for example, Wheeler 1996: especially
 271-72). Yet we should remember that the majority of
 Roman soldiers - like their modern equivalents - would
 rarely have seen actual combat and so most could well
 have been considered lax and undisciplined (see Dobson
 1986: 23), especially by a martinet such as Corbulo.
 Thus, given that the east was hardly the most dangerous
 of military postings, Tacitus' allegations regarding the
 readiness of these men for war may well contain an
 element of truth.
 The next chapter in Tacitus' Annales (13.9) reports
 how relations between Corbulo and Quadratus went from
 bad to worse in the winter of 55-56, once each learnt that
 the other had independently sent messages to the
 Parthian ruler suggesting peace negotiations. Tacitus
 implies that Vologaeses happily accepted the proposal, as
 it allowed him to concentrate his energies on the
 campaign against Vardanes, but he then tells us of the
 confusion that developed over which general should
 receive the Parthian hostages Vologaeses offered to
 secure the matter. Indeed, this anxious state of affairs
 was only resolved when the men involved chose to
 surrender to an auxiliary cohort dispatched by Corbulo
 and not the legionary centurion representing Quadratus.
 Still smarting from the loss of one half of his command,
 a now even more offended Quadratus immediately
 complained to Nero that he had been robbed of a
 deserved diplomatic victory, Corbulo countering (with
 some justice?) that his own reputation and arrival in
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 Galatia-Cappadocia had forced Vologaeses into negotia
 tions. Nero hastily sought a compromise, and ordered
 that both men should be equally honoured for the
 'victory'.
 As was so often the case in the eastern territories,
 though, an emperor's public announcement of 'mission
 accomplished' was wildly premature. Vologaeses may
 have been agreeable to enter negotiations over Armenia
 Major, but he was not yet prepared to relinquish control
 of the kingdom. This is why Corbulo spent the year 57
 preparing for war, first releasing from active service
 those men who were unsuited for campaign; and then
 'restoring discipline' to his two existing legions while
 training the new recruits he received from Galatia and
 Cappadocia (Tacitus Annales 13.35; see Dio 62.29).
 Moreover, in anticipation of the war to come Corbulo
 was provided with a third legion, evidently the 7777
 Scythica, along with its auxiliary cavalry and infantry,
 these being dispatched from (or so we are told) the
 German garrison (Tacitus Annales 13.35, with 15.6;
 Dusanic 1978: 470-75; but note Speidel 1998: 165-67,
 175-76; with 2000: 329-31). As we will see, however,
 Corbulo decided that this legion should remain in
 Cappadocia, presumably as his main field reserve
 (Tacitus Annales 13.40, with 15.6). Nonetheless, even
 without the 7777 Scythia, the campaign army Corbulo
 assembled to take into Armenia Major the following
 spring must have numbered at least 20,000 men, while to
 prepare his men for the coming campaign he kept this
 entire force under canvas for the winter of 57-58 (Tacitus
 Annales 13.35; see Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae 9108).
 Corbulo's battle-plan envisaged a decisive initial
 thrust along the upper Araxes (Aras) valley towards
 Artaxata (Artasat), the then capital of Armenia Major
 (see Tacitus Annales 13.39). Therefore, his army
 probably spent that winter of 57-58 in the Erzincan
 Ovasi, an agriculturally rich plain located 200km west of
 the Araxes watershed, and whose area of about 750km2
 made it eminently suitable for assembling and training
 the large numbers of men involved as well as satisfying
 their basic food and other logistical needs (see Mitford
 1974: 166; Sinclair 1989: 426-30; Russell 1987: 249).
 Yet like any other competent field commander, Corbulo
 foresaw the dangers inherent in keeping a large army in
 one place on training manoeuvres or foraging without
 providing for their overall security against surprise attack
 and securing the supply route(s) that brought those
 materials and items not available locally. For this reason
 the year 57 also saw the construction of praesidia, a
 series of auxiliary forts intended to secure his primary
 supply route from Trapezus via the Zigana pass towards
 Eriza (Erzincan): in other words this was a limes in the
 contemporary (early imperial) sense of the word, a series
 of fortified posts along a marked via militaris or military
 road (Isaac 1988: 126-28). These praesidia were estab
 lished 'at the appropriate locations' by Paccius Orfitius,
 a former primus pilus, who was subsequently given
 overall command of their auxiliary garrisons, and it is
 clear from Tacitus' account that these garrisons were to
 take a proactive role if necessary (Tacitus Annales
 13.36-37). Moreover, and what is of greater relevance
 here, while Corbulo was surveying the terrain and
 deciding where these praesidia should be built, he
 personally met and agreed an alliance with the Moschici,
 an ethnos which controlled the upper parts of the ?oruh
 valley, revealing how certain of these praesidia were
 probably established well to the east of the Zigana pass
 route and quite possibly as far east as 'Hiberia' in the
 direction of the Dariel pass (Tacitus Annales 13.36-37,
 39; see Pliny Historia Naturalis 6.15.40). In other words,
 Corbulo's praesidia were built not only along the line of
 the via militaris from Trapezus to Eriza, but were also
 dispersed throughout the broader Pontic region to facil
 itate closer control of the relevant territory.
 Tacitus does not indicate whether or not a similar
 system of praesidia existed along the Euphrates to the
 south of the Erzincan Ovasi. However, it is frankly
 inconceivable that Corbulo would have risked leaving
 Cappadocia open to attack from the adjacent part of
 Armenia Major in a repeat of the disastrous and
 disgraceful events of 51 (see Tacitus Annales 12.49).
 Indeed, he was clearly aware that such a potential threat
 applied to parts at least of the Euphrates line, for he
 ordered Antiochus of Commagene to occupy the
 Armenian praefecturial districts bordering his own
 kingdom (Tacitus Annales 13.37).
 On the other hand, the more obvious danger to
 Cappadocia was an attack using the route between
 Melitene (Eski Malatya or Battalgazi) and the valley of
 the Arsanias (Mur?t Su). In 68 BC, this route had
 provided Lucullus with speedy access into Anzitene and
 then along the Arsanias towards the heart of Armenia
 Major, and it could just as easily be used in the opposite
 direction. So, as the 7777 Scythica clearly did not form
 part of the army that Corbulo led into the Araxes valley
 in 58 (see Tacitus Annales 13.40), he may well have
 placed it at Melitene to guard against this eventuality.
 That aside, it should not be forgotten that the Euphrates
 valley provided Corbulo with his main means of direct
 contact with Syria, and thus reserves of men and material
 if these should be needed: in fact his campaign army
 contained a detachment that had been seconded from the
 X Fretensis and which had presumably marched to the
 upper Euphrates by this route (Tacitus Annales 40). In
 which case it could be that our cautious general also
 reinforced any existing local militias along the
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 Cappadocian sector of the upper Euphrates with Roman
 auxiliary contingents - after all, he had troops to spare
 for the purpose. Not only did he have his third legion in
 reserve, presumably with its own assigned auxiliary
 contingents, but he also had use of the auxilia who were
 stationed in their 'winter quarters' in Cappadocia (and
 Galatia) at the time he was initially appointed to his
 command (Tacitus Annales 13.8.).
 What is being suggested here, therefore, is that the
 genesis of the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier is to be found
 in Corbulo's decision to fortify the route from Trabzon to
 Erzincan and the adjacent area with a series of auxiliary
 praesidia, along with a hypothetical continuation of this
 system into Armenia Minor, and down the Euphrates as
 far as Commagene. That both Pontus and Armenia Minor
 were nominally independent states does not negate this
 supposition, for since the time of Augustus, client states
 within and on the periphery of Rome's provinces had
 been wholly subject to Roman control (see Strabo 17.3.25
 [840]). Likewise, we might reject the views of some
 modern scholars who deny there was ever a need for a
 regular system of auxiliary forts along the upper
 Euphrates, as Cappadocia bordered a state with a stable
 and Hellenised system of government, and so did not need
 the type of controlled border found along other land
 frontiers (see, for example, Hodgson 1989: 181-82).
 Such an argument ignores not only the existing political
 reality, but also the nature of the terrain and the predomi
 nately semi-nomadic life-style of the peoples who lived
 hereabouts at the time. The many tributary valleys that
 run into the upper Euphrates from both east and west
 provide a means of access to and thus passage over the
 river in either direction for those who come in peace or in
 war. Indeed, they apparently served as a conduit for the
 trans-Euphratean raiders who were recognised as a real
 threat to the region from at least the early first century
 BC, when the rulers of Armenia Major began to appoint
 vitaxa, 'border generals', in the kingdom's peripheral
 regions (see Edwards 1986: 181). More usually, however,
 the same valleys allowed peaceful interaction and inter
 course between two areas of shared cultural and social
 affinities, and were used by traders and by those
 transhumant farmers migrating in the summer from the
 dryer eastern Anatolian steppe to the Armenian highlands.
 But no matter who trod such routes, and for whatever
 reason, it was a form of inter-state activity that Rome
 needed to control and supervise, if only for fiscal reasons.
 Yet it has to be conceded that apart from Tacitus'
 report regarding the Pontic 'limes', there is little else to
 support the premise that Corbulo initiated work on a de
 facto frontier system along the entire Euphrates line from
 Eriza to the borders of Commagene. Indeed, the only
 fortified site of a broadly appropriate date known from
 this line is that at Kilise Yazisi, a place that controlled a
 crossing of the Euphrates and which is located at or close
 to the Dascusa reported in several of the Classical
 sources (Pliny Historia Naturalis 5.20, 6.10; Ptolemy
 Geographia 5.7; Notitia Dignitatum Oriens 38.22). This
 site was only partly examined (in a hurried fashion)
 immediately before its immersion, and to judge from the
 artefactual evidence then recovered there and the style of
 its fortifications, it was probably a Hellenistic foundation
 of indigenous origin (see Bennett 2002: 302, fig. 1). In
 which case we should reject suggestions that it might
 represent a Roman fort (as, for example, Sinclair 1989:
 94; Wheeler 1997a: 223). Even so, certain of the
 indigenous pre-Roman fortified sites in Britain have
 provided evidence that the Roman army was not averse to
 utilizing them and their fortifications when necessary
 during campaign periods (see Todd 1985). Moreover,
 recent work at Gordion has shown that a section at least
 of a Roman auxiliary unit was based within the earlier
 settlement site there from possibly the Julio-Claudian
 period and certainly from Flavian times, and this place
 continued to be used by the Roman army until the reign
 of Trajan or Hadrian. Given the evident tactical impor
 tance attached to the Euphrates crossing close to Kilise
 Yazisi in later years, with an auxiliary unit being based
 hereabouts from at least the Flavian period into the fourth
 century, then it is at least conceivable that the site (or its
 vicinity) may also have been (re-)used by one of
 Corbulo's auxiliary units.
 The formalisation of the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier
 Although we remain ignorant concerning the finer details
 of the defensive and offensive strategies supervised by
 Corbulo in 57, they persuaded Tiridates to explore the
 potential of peace negotiations, although in the event, he
 refused to submit to Rome. This initiated Corbulo's great
 Armenian campaign of 58-60, and the eventual instal
 lation of the pro-Roman Tigranes on the Armenian
 throne. These are events that do not concern us here, and
 they have in any case been discussed in detail elsewhere
 (Henderson 1901; Wheeler 1997b). However, we should
 note that in 60, after Quadratus died in office, Corbulo
 was appointed legatus of Syria while simultaneously
 retaining his authority over Galatia-Cappadocia; and that
 in 61 Tigranes brought a Parthian attack upon himself by
 invading Adiabene, forcing Corbulo to despatch two
 legions to his aid. It seems that these two legions were
 the 7777 Scythica and the XII Fulminata, and that both
 were sent into Armenia Major from Cappadocia, as they
 are known to have spent the winter of 61-62 in that
 province. (Tacitus Annales 15.1-3, with 6). Either way,
 by the end of the year 61 both these legions and the
 auxilia of Galatia-Cappadocia, as well as those auxiliary
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 units 'in the Pontus', came under the authority of
 Caesennius Paetus, the newly arrived legatus of the joint
 province. Moreover, Paetus was evidently mandated by
 Nero to incorporate Armenia Major into the Roman
 Imperium, for by the end of the same year the V
 Maced?nica had been ordered to leave its base at
 Troesmis in Moesia for the Pontus, presumably travelling
 by ship, while the XV Apollinaris was commanded to
 leave its home at Carnuntum for Cappadocia, using (it
 would seem) the land route (Tacitus Annales 15.6, with
 15.25; see Wheeler 2000: 274-75).
 The sequence of events that followed, including
 Paetus' disastrous Armenian foray in 62, as well as the
 show of force by Corbulo leading to the Peace of
 Rhandeia in 63, and Rome's reluctant acceptance of a
 Parthian nominee, Tiridates I, as the new ruler of
 Armenia Major, are also of no direct concern in the
 present paper. Except, that is, to note three things. The
 first is how Corbulo brought with him from Syria to
 Melitene the legiones III Gallica and VIF errata, and that
 for the purposes of saving Paetus and his army he also
 took command of the XV Apollinaris and the V
 Maced?nica, the latter unit having been left 'languishing'
 in Pontus since its arrival in 61-62 (Tacitus Annales
 15.25, 26; also Wheeler 2000: 274-75). The second is
 that after Corbulo arrived on the scene and secured the
 safety of what remained of Paetus' army, he transferred
 the legiones IIII Scythica and XII Fulminata to Syria
 (Tacitus Annales 15.26, 27). Finally, we should observe
 how our sources do not provide so much as a hint that
 Corbulo was obliged to instantly take his army out of
 Armenia Major itself in order to secure the terms agreed
 at Rhandeia, a situation quite unlike that which prevailed
 after Paetus' surrender in 62, when all his troops were at
 once withdrawn from the territory (Tacitus Annales
 15.14; Dio 62.21.2). Indeed, there is epigraphic evidence
 to show that at least one of Corbulo's legions remained in
 Armenia Major until as late as 64-65, which is when the
 777 Gallica was involved in some substantial building
 work at Kass?rik (Harput) in the southern part of the
 kingdom (Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum 3.6741-43 =
 Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae 232).
 On the other hand, Nero and his advisers could not
 have failed to perceive the inherent danger in a situation
 whereby Parthia asserted dominance over an Armenia
 Major that had a member of the Parthian Arsacid dynasty
 emplaced as its ruler. A future attack on Asia Minor
 and/or Syria by a united Parthian and Armenian army
 was a real possibility: which is why - as we will see -
 Nero chose to keep the legiones III, V, VI and XV in the
 Anatolian-Eurasian interface zone after the Peace of
 Rhandeia was agreed. Furthermore, it was doubtless in
 connection with this nascent threat that Pontus Polemo
 niacus was annexed to Galatia-Cappadocia in 63-64,
 Polemo being given Cilicia Tracheia as a consolation
 prize, the Trapezountian militia being elevated to the
 status of a Roman auxiliary cohort, its men being given
 Roman weapons and armour as well as Roman
 citizenship, while Trapezus itself now became the base
 the incipient Classis Pontica (Josephus de Bello Judaico
 2.16.4; Tacitus Historiae 3.47; Suetonius Nero 18; also
 Sullivan 1980b: 930). That aside, it seems that Corbulo
 was probably in charge of all these developments, as the
 evidence suggests he was re-appointed as legatus of the
 now greatly enlarged Galatia-Cappadocia command after
 Rhandeia, holding that position until he committed
 suicide at Cenchreae (Dio 63.17.5-6). This might be
 deduced from the fact that Corbulo was replaced as
 legatus of Syria in 63 by Cestius Gallus, and there is a
 gap existing in the list of provincial legad for Galatia
 Cappadocia between Paetus' ruinous tenure of office and
 the appointment of Calpurnius Asprenas in 68-69.
 Strong grounds, then, for believing that Corbulo, Rome's
 pre-eminent general, spent the relevant period in a second
 term as governor of the enlarged Galatia-Cappadocia and
 its then garrison of initially four and then three legions,
 for this would be an entirely appropriate choice of
 command for a man of his experience.
 Whether or not Corbulo did hold the enlarged
 Galatia-Cappadocia command in 63-67, we do need to
 consider the reason(s) that prompted the annexation of
 Polemo's kingdom. Now, it is true that Pontus Polemo
 niacus had been a de facto military district of the Roman
 Empire from at least 57, when Corbulo established his
 Pontic limes. Moreover, the legio V Maced?nica was to
 all intents and purposes stationed there in 61-63 while
 awaiting action in Armenia Major. Even so, the annex
 ation of the kingdom to make it an entirely Roman
 territory, and in the process ejecting its entirely
 complaisant ruler, hints at some longer-term strategic or
 tactical plan devised by Nero and his advisers for the
 general region. Indeed, it could well have been, as some
 suggest, that Pontus Polemoniacus was seized to provide
 a 'jump-off point' for the 'Caspian' campaign that Nero
 was planning towards the end of his reign. As it is, our
 information regarding this proposed enterprise is not of
 the best, for it consists essentially of the bare facts that in
 66 Nero raised a new legion, the legio I It?lica, specifi
 cally for an operation aimed at the 'Caspian Gates'; and
 that the same year saw the transfer to the Danube of the
 XIV Gemina from Britain and several army detachments
 from Germany and Illyria to prepare for a 'Caspian' war
 against the Albani (Suetonius Nero 19.2; Tacitus
 Historiae 1.6, with 2.32; Dio 63.8.1; and Mitford 1980a:
 1178). To this we might add the factual detail that
 although the XV Apollinaris was despatched to
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 Alexandria in Egypt sometime before 66 (Josephus de
 Bello Judaico 3.1.8; Dio 63.8.1), there were still perhaps
 as many as three legions in the Anatolian-Eurasian
 interface zone at the time, namely the legiones III, V and
 VI. In other words, the known and suspected military
 dispositions in 66 do allow for the possibility that - as
 many modern authorities believe - Nero annexed Pontus
 Polemoniacus as part of a planned attack against the
 Sarmatians by way of the Caucasus, Tacitus and
 Suetonius having simply confused the real Caspian Gates,
 the Rhagae-Sirdara pass in modern Iran, once crossed by
 Alexander the Great, with the Caucasian Gates or Dariel
 pass (Pliny Historia Naturalis 6.15.40.181; Anderson
 1928: 130-32). On the other hand, such an interpretation
 of the evidence ignores the possibility that our
 sources are in fact correct: perchance Nero really did
 intend a Caspian expedition, one that was initially
 directed against the Albani as a first stage in an invasion
 of the Parthian heartland via Media and Adiabene.
 Yet when all is said and done, we must remember that
 in 63-64, when Pontus Polemoniacus was annexed, a
 clear and present threat to Roman interests in this region
 existed in the reality of an Arsacid in place on the
 Armenian throne, and so we might reasonably doubt that
 the possibility of a future Caucasian/Caspian offensive
 provided the primary motive for annexing Polemo's
 kingdom. In which case a more logical reason suggests
 itself for this ostensibly peremptory action, namely that it
 was (initially, at least) annexed for purely tactical reasons.
 In other words, to ensure Tiridates' compliance with the
 wishes of Rome by securing and making permanent
 Corbulo's via militaris between Trapezus and Eriza, and
 thence - it is assumed here - to Cappadocia and
 Commagene. After all, Corbulo's arrangements in 57
 aside and no matter the nature and distribution of the
 praesidia he created at that time, by 68 at the very latest,
 this border region between Roman and Armenian territory
 had certainly been transformed into a formal military
 zone. This is certified by no less an authority than
 Tacitus, who in reporting army deployments at the end of
 that year indicates that a series of auxiliary units were
 then in Cappadocia on a permanent basis and stationed
 'facing towards' Armenia Major: in other words, they
 were in forts positioned along the Pontic-Cappadocian
 frontier (Tacitus Historiae 2.6). So, while we remain
 uncertain as to Nero's original motives for annexing
 Pontus Polemoniacus, it seems more than likely that as
 Armenia Major was then in Arsacid hands, then the event
 coincided with (and perhaps spurred) a formalisation of
 the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier - which is why the credit
 for creating the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier should really
 be given to Nero and not Vespasian, as generally stated
 (Mitford 1980a: 1180; Mitchell 1993: 118).
 The overall line of this pre-68 frontier system is
 relatively clear, as the general course of the road that
 formed its backbone must have corresponded to a large
 extent with the general course of the Trapezus-Samosata
 route as this is recorded by the later Itinerarium (provin
 ciarium) Antonini (Augusti) and the Tabula Peutinge
 riana. It is true that in some sectors these two sources
 radically differ with regard to their listing of stations
 along the way (for example, Mitford 1980b). But this is
 because they describe variant options for following the
 same general route, the first being an official document
 listing a series of itineraries compiled over a period of
 time for planning imperial journeys, the second a 'road
 map' for civil use, but probably derived from an itinerary
 intended for the cursus publicus (Dilke 1998: 115, 125).
 As such, they describe whatever route is more convenient
 for the purpose in hand, and thus not necessarily the
 precise line taken by the via militaris here, never mind a
 route that rigidly led from one fort to the next (see Crow,
 French 1980: 907-09).
 The point being that a via militaris follows the most
 convenient route required for patrol and regulatory
 purposes, which is why roads of this type were driven
 along ridges rather than taking the often more
 'convenient' route along a valley. Furthermore, where
 such military roads were not part of any principal
 communications route, then they were often simple viae
 terrenae, cleared tracks 'paved' with compacted natural
 or gravelled surfaces, which explains why proving the
 course of such a road is often a difficult task (for example,
 Graf 1997: 124-25). Moreover, it was the existence of a
 via militaris that provided the raison d'?tre for the forts
 established along its route rather than the forts being the
 reason for the route of the road (see Isaac 1992: 128).
 After all, the locations the Roman army chose for its forts
 were dictated by tactical necessity, together with the
 requirements of space and local environmental factors -
 which is why so many of these fort sites (or their
 immediate localities) remained in use throughout the
 principate and into the dominate. Consequently, it was
 not unusual for a fort to be located some distance and at
 a different altitude from the main path of an associated
 via militaris with the two elements being linked by a
 lesser trackway; a state of affairs best seen in the original
 plan of Hadrian's Wall (see Daniels 1978: 38). All in all,
 then, it is clear that the Itinerarium Antonini and the
 Tabula Peutingeriana are of relatively limited use in
 establishing either the precise line of the via militaris or
 the exact locations of the praesidia that formed the
 principal elements of the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier.
 Even so, when considered alongside the information
 provided by Ptolemy's Geographia and the Notitia
 Dignitatum, the Itinerarium Antonini and the Tabula
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 Peutingeriana are of great use in preparing a provisional
 schedule of the military stations established along Nero's
 Pontic-Cappadocian limes. Thus, as we learn from the
 resolute work of Timothy Mitford (1998), in the northern
 part of the region the via militaris probably ignored the
 easier route south by way of the Zigana pass (2,025m) to
 transect the Pontic mountains using the longer and more
 difficult eastern track over the Kiranbey Tepe (2,380m).
 It then ran via the evocatively-named Frig<i>darium
 (Anzarya Hanlan) towards Domana (Komanir Tepe or
 Kose) and Satala (Sadak), and thence by way of the
 Kol?ekmezdagi pass (2,100m) to the Erzincan Ovasi.
 However, from here to Zimara (?Pingan), and then
 Melitene and on to Charmodara in Syria, the military
 surveyors faced a major problem, as much of the upper
 Euphrates is contained within gorges, with space only for
 a mule-track in places (see Mitford 1980b: 913-15).
 True, when the Roman army faced a similar predicament
 at the Iron Gates gorge on the Danube, they resolved it by
 building a wooden walkway cantilevered from one side
 of the chasm (Sasel 1973); but no evidence has ever been
 noted at any point along the Euphrates to suggest such a
 solution was adopted here.
 As a result, in these parts the via militaris ran along
 the higher terrain that lay to the west of the Euphrates
 proper, as did the communications routes listed in the
 Itinerarium Antonini and the Tabula Peutingeriana (see
 Mitford 1980b: 915). Moreover, this higher elevation
 was also where most of the garrisons responsible for
 patrol work along this part of the Euphrates and the road
 itself were stationed, as at Chiaca (Morhamam), Sabus
 (?it K?y) and Carsagis (Melik ?erif). True, which ever
 precise line was chosen for such a route it involved
 negotiating steep and abraded slopes that in some places
 rise to between l,700-2,500m, and thus generally ice
 and snow-bound from early November until the end of
 March (see Erin? 1969: 346; Wheeler 1997a: 223). The
 Roman army was prepared for such matters, however,
 spring and summer being the principal seasons for
 replenishing any necessary supplies, allowing fort
 garrisons to build a stockpile for periods when regular
 access could not be guaranteed (see Tacitus Agr?cola
 22.1). That aside, we should note how the often sheer
 sides of the upper Euphrates' gorges are broken by places
 where alluvial deposits from confluent streams have
 created level areas suitable for settlement - and for
 access across the Euphrates itself. Hence the existence of
 such settlements (and probably military garrisons) at
 Vereuso (Geru?la) and at Barsalium (Killik), where
 passage over the Euphrates was possible in the summer
 months, with spur trackways running up from river-level
 to the more level terrain that lay above and to the west
 where the north-south 'frontier' road was.
 It is likely that some of the men from the four legions
 Corbulo had in hand after Rhandeia were employed on
 the formalisation of the Neronian frontier dispositions.
 More to the point, it is probable that after the departure
 of the XVApollinaris for Egypt in ca. 65, the other three
 legions (the 777, V and VI) still remained in the Galatia
 Cappadocia-Pontus region when the Jewish Revolt began
 in late 66. Such becomes clear only if we briefly digress
 to examine what is known of the military deployments at
 the time of the revolt, beginning with the single known
 relevant fact that, when the revolt began, Cestius Gallus,
 the governor of Syria, decided to use the legio XIII
 Fulminata and 2,000-strong vexillations from his 'other
 legions' to resolve the matter (Josephus de Bello Judaico
 2.18.9). Now one of these 'other legions' must have
 been the X Fretensis, as although it supplied a vexil
 lation for Corbulo's first Armenian campaign, it
 remained in Syria throughout Nero's reign (see Tacitus
 Annales 40; also Josephus de Bello Judaico 2.19.1). The
 identity of the other legions involved in Gallus' task
 force is not certain, but it is generally assumed they were
 the 777 and VI, for these were certainly in Syria at the
 conclusion of the First Jewish Revolt (for example,
 Levick 1999: 27-28; see Dabrowa 2000: 310).
 However, there is evidence to caution against this belief,
 and which is also directly relevant to the military status
 of Galatia-Cappadocia at this time.
 To begin with, it is important to know that the 777
 Gallica, which is attested at Kass?rik (Harput) in
 southern Armenia in 64-65 (Corpus Inscriptionum
 Latinarum 3.6741-43 = Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae
 232), was transferred early in 68 to Moesia in response
 to raids over the Danube by the Roxolani of Wallachia
 (Tacitus Historiae 1.79; Suetonius Vespasian 6.3). Now
 these raids were no doubt inspired by the weakening of
 the Danubian front's central sector after the dispatch in
 61-62 of the V Maced?nica from Troesmis to Pontus,
 where the legion subsequently 'languished' until at least
 63 (Tacitus Annales 15.26). However, by April 67, the
 VMaced?nica was in Ptolemais, Judaea, where it joined
 up with the legiones X Fretensis and the XVApollinaris
 to constitute Vespasian's Judaean task-force (Josephus
 de Bello Judaico 3.4.2). Thus when reinforcements were
 urgently needed for the Danubian front, it was the 777
 Gallica that was sent there, as it was evidently the
 nearest legion that could be deployed to Moesia when
 the occasion demanded. In other words, it seems most
 improbable that the entire force of the 777 Gallica could
 have been in Syria and under Gallus' command in 66: it
 is much more likely that the bulk of the legion remained
 in Galatia-Cappadocia after Corbulo's campaign (see
 Keppie 1986: 420, who implies as much). Only in this
 way could it have been available to be transferred post
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 haste to Moesia when reinforcements were urgently
 needed there. And it follows that if the 777 Gallica was
 still in Galatia-Cappadocia in 66-68, the VI Ferrata may
 also have been there as well, thus confirming the
 territory's continued administrative and military status
 as a senior imperial province. Indeed, as far as we can
 determine from our sources, Galatia-Cappadocia
 retained at least one legion in its garrison until at least
 mid-68 (Tacitus Historiae 2.6; Josephus de Bello
 Judaico 2.364-87, with 7.18).
 The Flavians and the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier
 Vespasian's acclamation as emperor in absentia in
 December of 69 had an almost instant effect on the
 political and military situation of the Anatolian
 provinces and client states. In fact, we might speculate
 that these reforms may well have been initiated as early
 as 70 when the new emperor made his return journey to
 Rome via the coast of Asia Minor (see Philostratus Vita
 Apollonii 5.41). One of the first was evidently the
 removal of Aristobulus from the throne of Armenia
 Minor, after which his kingdom was attached to Galatia
 Cappadocia, while Polemo of Cilicia Tracheia was
 deposed for a second time, the territory he had received
 in compensation for the Pontus now being assigned to
 the province of Cilicia (Suetonius Vespasian 8.4;
 Mitford 1980a: 1180-81; Reinach 1925: 136, nos 3-8).
 Moreover, it was evidently in connection with these
 events that Vespasian decided to re-affirm the status of
 Galatia-Cappadocia as a senior (consular) imperial
 propraetorian command by deploying at first one and
 then two legions there on a permanent basis (Suetonius
 Vespasian 8.4). Thus sometime before the end of 70,
 Melitene in Cappadocia, the focus of Roman military
 activity on several earlier occasions and most recently
 the spring-board for Corbulo's second Armenian
 campaign, became the base for the XII Fulminata
 (Josephus de Bello Judaico 7.1-3; Tacitus Annales
 15.27). However, the location chosen for the second
 legionary fortress, at Satala, a day's march from the
 Erzincan Ovasi, would appear to have been an essen
 tially new locus operandi for the Roman military, for
 although it commands three main routes between the
 Pontus and the two Armenias (Bryer, Winfield 1985:
 33), it is situated in a rather small and enclosed basin,
 making it unsuitable for assembling a large campaign
 army of the size that Corbulo used in his Armenian
 campaigns. That apart, there is some uncertainty as to
 exactly when this legionary fortress was established.
 This is because its earliest known garrison was the
 newly-formed XVI Flavia, born in the Rhineland in 70
 71 from remnants of the legio XVI Gallica after its poor
 conduct in the Batavian Revolt, but as 'soldiers' (sic) of
 the legion are attested working at Antioch in April-June
 75, then it seems that the legion may have been initially
 assigned to Syria and did not arrive in Cappadocia until
 after that date (Van Berchem 1983: 189-91).
 The epigraphic record as its currently stands, in
 indicating that Vespasian's reformed consular province of
 Galatia-Cappadocia may not have received its second
 legion until 75 or later, presents us with certain problems.
 To begin with, it directly contradicts the literary record,
 but it also suggests that Vespasian chose to ignore the
 relatively perilous situation that existed along the eastern
 frontier at the very beginning of his reign. This was, after
 all, a time when not only was there work still to be done
 on suppressing the Jewish Revolt but several other parts
 of the Empire were experiencing strife at this time, and so
 there was a real chance that the Parthians might take
 advantage of the situation to advance into Armenia Major
 and Cappadocia. As it was, such was the perceived
 potential of a Parthian incursion that, in 72, Vespasian
 found it necessary to depose Antiochus of Commagene
 and annex his kingdom to Syria, and then station a legion
 in the territory (Josephus de Bello Judaico 7.219-243;
 Suetonius Vespasian 8.4; but note Dabrowa 1994: 19
 27). That aside, the available evidence strongly suggests
 that the most likely candidate as Vespasian's first
 governor of this revived legionary command is M.Ulpius
 Traianus, father of the later emperor Trajan, and suffect
 consul (in absential) in September-October 70 (Syme
 1958: 31, n. 1; Gallivan 1981: 187-99, 213; Bennett
 2001: 17, 216). Yet a single legion province would (in
 theory, at least) be entirely unbecoming for an ex-consul
 such as Traianus, for his status entitled him to a senior
 imperial province with at least two legions in praesidia
 (Dabrowa 1998:162, n. 657; Caballos Rufino 1990: 307).
 However, in the state of flux surrounding the end of the
 civil war of 68-69, and the imposition of the new regime
 and its associated military deployments, it could be that
 neither Vespasian nor Traianus were especially bothered
 by the niceties of the formal Roman administrative
 hierarchy at this time.
 Such apart, by 76 at the latest, Cn.Pompeius Collega,
 the then governor of Galatia-Cappadocia, had embarked
 on the creation of a formal network of permanent roads in
 the province (French 1988: no. 365; see R?my 1989: 187
 88). This road-building project seems to have been inten
 sified or at the least was still under way between 80-81
 and 82-83, when A.Caesennius Gallus was governor of
 Galatia-Cappadocia (French 1988: nos 76, 93, 98, 108,
 111, 160, 375, (?)364,569 and 602; see R?my 1989: 190
 92; also Mitford 1980a: 1183-85; 1989; 1998; French
 1983: 84-94). From the point of view of this paper,
 however, what is of greater interest is an inscription which
 was found in a re-used context in the late Roman fort at
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 Pagnik ?greni, just across the river from Kilise Yazisi, for
 this records building work by an auxiliary unit under
 Gallus' oversight in the years 81-82 (Harper 1974: 108;
 Mitford 1974: 172). Unfortunately the text is incomplete,
 and so while we can be certain that the work was (osten
 sibly) completed under Gallus' direction, all that is known
 of the auxiliary cohors responsible is that it was numbered
 either II or III (the suggestion of Mitford [1974: 172] that
 it was the cohors II Ulpia milliaria Petraeorum is impos
 sible on chronological grounds). As such, this text is of
 considerable significance in providing us with the earliest
 evidence to date for an auxiliary unit employed in
 masonry construction on its own behalf, as until the reign
 of Hadrian, this kind of work was usually undertaken by
 the supposedly more skilled legionaries (see Lander 1984:
 20-30; also Bennett 2006: 293-94).
 However, what is important here is the find-spot of
 this inscription, directly across the Euphrates from Kilise
 Yazisi, a place that (as we have already seen) is situated
 at a crossing point of the Euphrates which more or less
 coincides with the location of the Dascusa known from
 the Classical sources (Pliny Historia Naturalis 5.20,
 6.10; Ptolemy Geographia 5.7). Whether or not Kilise
 Yazisi (or its vicinity) was also the location of one of the
 Neronian period forts along the Pontic-Cappadocian
 frontier, as implied above, is now unverifiable, but it does
 at least seem possible, given that this inscription
 indubitably demonstrates that by the beginning of
 Domitian's reign at the very latest it was found necessary
 to (?re)build an auxiliary fort hereabouts. Indeed, the
 Notitia Dignitatum confirms that Dascusa retained a
 tactical role into the later fourth century, by when it was
 the home base of the ala II [Ulpia] Auriana (Notitia
 Dignitatum Oriens 38.22), although whether this unit
 occupied the known late Roman fortification of Pagnik
 ?greni is uncertain.
 The Dascusa text apart, little else could be said until
 quite recently concerning the nature of the auxiliary
 garrison in Galatia-Cappadocia under the Flavians, other
 than that the units concerned are likely to have occupied
 sites originally established by Corbulo. All this changed
 in 2001, however, with the rapid appearance on the art
 market of no less than one complete and two fragmentary
 auxiliary diplomata that were issued for the province in
 the years 94, 100 and 101 (Eck, Pangerl 2004; Pferdehirt
 2004:18-19). For those unfamiliar with these documents,
 all that needs to be said here is that they are the bronze
 versions of one type of discharge document available to
 Roman auxiliary soldiers when they completed their 25
 years of service; and that an intact example will often
 provide a virtually complete list of the auxiliary garrison
 within a specific province on a specific date (see Bennett
 2007: 132-34 for a fuller account). A comprehensive
 analysis of these specific texts along with other sources
 that inform us about the auxiliary units stationed in
 Galatia and Cappadocia in the Roman period is held over
 for another time and place. However, the listings these
 sources provide suggest that, from at least the later Flavian
 period onwards, the auxiliary garrison in Galatia
 Cappadocia usually consisted of three or four cavalry alae
 and 13 or 14 infantry cohortes, several of the latter being
 part-mounted cohortes equitata. Indeed, it would seem
 that almost one half of this auxiliary force consisted of
 cavalrymen in either the alae or in the part-mounted
 cohortes equitata, a proportion of cavalry to infantry that
 indicates a garrison intended for wide-ranging patrols both
 within Roman territory and beyond (see the substantial
 cavalry detachments of the cohors I Hispanorum veterana
 equitata, at Stobi in Thrace, but across the Danube on
 expeditions and scouting duties: Lepper, Frere 1988: 244
 49, lines 26 and 32.259, especially).
 The point is of course that the Flavianic formalization
 of the Neronian frontier schedule for the Pontic
 Cappadocian frontier did not mark an end to Roman
 interests in matters to the east of that line, or the possi
 bility of intervention when considered necessary. The
 Augustan dictum, that kings and other foreign potentates
 only held their position with the grace of Caesar, still
 applied: their territories were not inviolate (see Strabo
 17.3.25 [840]). And in fact three well-known and oft
 quoted inscriptions from Classical Iberia and Albania
 provide clear evidence that this was the case within the
 Anatolian-Eurasian interface zone for the period we are
 concerned with. Of these, the earliest is from Harmozica,
 and records the building of defences there in 75 by
 Roman troops on behalf of Mithridates, king of Iberia
 (Supplementum Epigraphicum, Graecum 20.112). The
 second, from Gobustan, 44 miles southwest of Baku,
 dates to the reign of Domitian, and simply tells us that a
 centurion of the Z77 Fulminata, the legion based at
 Melitene at the time, was there (Lan?e ?pigraphique
 1951.263; see Heidenreich 1983). The third, at
 Karjagino (Fuzuli, Azerbaijan), also apparently recorded
 the XII Fulminata, although nothing further seems to be
 known of this apparently now-lost text (Mitford 1980a:
 1194, n. 57). It seems safe to assume, however, that all
 three texts reflect long-range hegemonic control of the
 region of the type known to have existed in Julio
 Claudian times, when a Roman garrison was stationed at
 Gorneae in Armenia Major (see Tacitus Annales 12.45
 47). Thus while the formal frontier of the Roman Empire
 in the critical hinge region at the southeastern corner of
 Eurasia may have been marked on the Pontic
 Cappadocian line, Roman interests in and influence over
 events east of there had by no means come to an end. But
 that is another story, and one to be told another time.
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